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Why Prosecutors Misbehave
By Bennett L.Gershman*
The authors-perhaps the nation's top authority on prosecuto-
rial misconduct-raises and analyzes two questions: Whydoes this
misconduct occur? (It often pays off.) And why does it continue?
(There are no effective sanctions.)
The duties of the prosecuting attorney were well-stated in
classic opinion of Justice Sutherland fifty years ago.' The
interest of the prosecutor, he wrote, "is not that he shall win a
case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar
and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim
of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He
may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should
do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty
to strike foul ones." 2
Despite this admonition, prosecuters continue to strike
"foul blows," perpetuating a disease which began long before
Justice Sutherland's oft"quoted opinion. Indeed, instances of
pf()secu1:oriial misconduct were reported at least as far back as
1897,' and as recently as the latest volume ofthe Supreme Court
Reporter. 4 The span between these cases is replete with innu-
merable instances of improper conduct of the prosecutor, much
WhICh defies belief.
* Professor of -Law, Pace University School of Law. Of counsel, Robert M.
Simels P.C., New York, N.Y. Author of "The Burger Court and Prosecutori'l
" 21 Crim. L. Bull. 217 (May-June 1985).
I Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935).
2 [d. at 88.
3 See Dunlop v. United States, 165 U.S. 486 (1897), where the prosecutor, in an
case,argued to the jury"I do not believe that there are twelve men that
be gathered by the venire ofthis court .. ; ,except where they were bought andSS':t':~~~~~;~~in advance, whose verdict I would not be willing to take...." [d. at 498.
this remark, defense counsel objected and the court held- that statement to
impro"per
See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 105 S. Ct. 2633 (1985) "(improper argument to
"~Ulmenselntencing jury); United States v. Young, 105 S. Ct. 1038 (1985) (improper
:\1 but not plain error).
131
-.
CRIMINAL LAW BULLETIN
132
6 643 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1981).
71d. at 51.
One of the leading examples of outrageous conduct by ajlj
prosecutor is Miller v. Pate, 5 where the prosecutor concealed~
from the jury in a murder case the fact that a pair of undershorts;1
with red stains on it, a crucial piece of evidence, were stained"ji'l
not by blood, but by paint. Equally startling is United States v.~8
Perry" where the prosecutor, in his summation, commented OA."lI
the fact that th~ "defendan~san~ t~eir .co~nsel are co.mPletely.•.·...•'...•.·.·i.~
unable-t'O explam away theIr gUIlt. 7 SImIlarly, the Dubose v")II
State,8 the prosecutor argued to the jury: "Now, not one sen-('~~
tence, not one scintilla ofevidence, not one word in any way didjrfifJl
this defendant or these attorneys challenge the credibility ofthe;il
complaining witness.'" At a time when it should be clear thatlil
constitutional and eithical standards prevent prosecutors from/:~~
behaving this way,'O we ought to question why prosecutors so 'i~:;;*~frequently engage in such conduct. 'iii
Much of the above misconducf occurs in a courtroom. The ,i~
terms "courtroom" or "forensic misconduct" have never been ..~~
precisely defined. One commentator describes courtroom mis-·s.M
conduct as those "types of misconduct which involve efforts to':~
influence the jury through various sorts of inadmissible eVi-il~
dence." 1I Another commentator suggests that forensic miscon~i.!
"'.:;
duct "may be generally defined as any activity by the pros- •.~
ecutor which tends to divert the jury from making its determi-"
nation of guilt or innocence by weighing the legally admitted:~
~vidence in the manner prescribed by law." 12 For purposes of \;--:,~i
5 386 U.S. I (1967). In this case, the Supreme Court overturned the defendaut's ;i;
convictiou after the Court of Appeals for the Seveuth Circuit had upheld it. The"
Court uoted that the prosecutor "deliberately lUisrepreseuted the truth," aud that.~
such behavior would not be tolerated under- the Fourteenth Amendmeut. ld. at 67.\
.'::,::;
}'1
8 53IS.W.2d 330 (Texas 1975).
'ld. at 331. The court noted that the argument was clearly a comment on the :)
failure of the defendant to testify at trial.
10 See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), where the Supreme Court applied
the Fifth Amendment.tothe states under the Fourteenth Amendment...
1I Alschuler, "Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial Judges,"50 Tex.
L Rev. 627, 633 (1972). .
/:
12' Note "The Nature arid Function of Forensic Misconduct in the'Prosecution of "
'. a Criminal 'Case," 54 Col. L Rev. 946, 949 (1954). . '4
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this analysis, the latter definition applies, as it encompasses a
broader array of behavior which can be classed as misconduct:
As will be seen, prosecutor~al misconduct can occur even with-
out the use of inadmissible evidence.
This article will address two aspects of the problem of court-
room misconduct. First, it will discuss why prosecutors engage
in courtroom misconduct, and then why our present system
offers.little incentive to a prosecutor to change his behavior.
Why Misconduct Occurs?
Intuition tells us that the reason so much courtroom miscon-
duct by the prosecutor13 occurs is quite simple: it works. From:
my experience as a prosecutor for ten years, I would hypothe-
size that most prosecutors deny that misconduct is helpful in
winning a case. Indeed, there is a strong philosophical argument
that prosecutorial misconduct corrupts the judical system,
thereby robbing it of its legitimacy. In this regard, one would
probably be hard pressed to find a prosecutor who would even
mention that he would consider the thought of some form of
misconduct.
Nonetheless, all of this talk is .merely academic, because as
we know, if only from the thousands. of cases in the reports,
courtroom misconduct does occur. If the prosecutor did not
believe it would be effective to stretch his argument to the
ethical limit, and then risk going beyond that ethical limit, he
would not take the risk.
Intuition aside, however, several studies have shown the
importance of oral advocacy in the courtroom, as well as the
effect produced by such conduct. For example, the student of
trial advocacy often is told of the· importance of the opening
statement. Prosecutors would undoubtedly agree that the open-
ing statement is indeed crucial. In a University of Kansas
study,14 the importance of the opening statement was con-
13 Of course,'thereis'also a significant amount ofdefense misconduct which takes
place. In- this respect;' fpf an interesting article which takes a different apprQach than
this article, see Kamm, "The Case for the Prosecutor," 13 U. Tol. L. Rev. 331
(1982), where the author notes that "courts carefully nurture the defendant's rights
While cavalierly ignoring the rights of the people." .
14 Pyszczynski, "The Effects'of Opening Statement on Mock Jurors' Verdicts in
. a Simulated Criminal Trial," 11.1. Applied Soc. Psychology 301 '(1981).
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firmed. From this study, the authors concluded that, in the
course of any given trial,15 the jurors were affected most by the
first strong presentation which they saw. This finding leads to"
the conclusion that if a prosecutor were to present a particularly
strong opening argument, the jury would favor the prosecution
throughout the trial. Alternatively, if the prosecutor were to
provide a weak opening statement, followed by a strong open-
.ingstatement by the defense, then, acC6rding to the authors, the
jury would favor the defense during the trial. It thus becomes
evident that the prosecutor will be best served by making the
strongest opening argument possible, thereby assisting the jury
in gaining a better insight into what they are about to hear and
see. The opportunity for the prosecutor to influence the jury at
this point in the trial is considerable, and virtually all' pros-
ecutors would probably attempt to use this opportunity to their
advantage, even if the circumstances do not call for lengthy or
dramatic opening remarks. I.
An additional aspect of the prosecutor's power over the jury
is suggested in a University of North Carolina study.17 This
study found that the more arguments counsel raises with re-
spect to the different substantive arguments offered, the more
the jury will believe in that party's case. Moreover, this study
found that' there is not necessarily a correlation between the
amount of objective information in the communication and the
persuasiveness of the presentation.
For the trial attorney, then, this study clearly points to the
advantage of raising as many issues as possible at trial. For the
prosecutor, the two studies taken together would dictate an
"action packed" opening statement, containing as manyargu-
ments that can be mustered, even those which might be irrele-
vant or unnecessary to convince thejury ofthe defendant's guilt.
The second study would also dictate the same strategy for the
closing argument. Consequently, a prosecutor who, through use
15 All of the cited studies include within the report a caveat about the val~e of the
studywhen'applied to a "real world" case. Nonetheless, theyare still worthwhile for
the'pUI;po'seof this analysis.
16" In some jurisdictions, attorneys may often use the voir dire to accomplish:the
goal. of .eady influence of the jury.
11 "Calder, '.'The Relation of Cognitive and Memorial Processes to Persuasion'in a
Simulated Jury Trial'" 4 J, Applied 80c. Psychology 62 (1974).
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of these techniques, attempts to assure that the jury knows his
case may, despite violating ethical standards to seek justice,"
be "rewarded" with a guilty verdict. Thus, one begins to per-
ceive the incentive that leads the prosecutor. to misbehave in the
rt 19cou room.
Similar incentives can be seen with respect to the complex
problem of controlling evidenc.e to which the jury may have
access. It is common knowledge that, in the course of any trial, .
statements frequently are made by the attorneys or witnesses,
despite the fact that these statments may not be admissible as
evidence. Following such a statement, the trial judge may, at
the request of opposing counsel, instruct the jury to disregard
what they have heard. Most trial lawyers, if they are candid,
will agree that it is virtually impossible for jurors realistically to
disregard these inadmissible statelfients. Studies here again
demonstrate that our intuition is correct, and that this evidence
often is considered by jurors in reaching a verdict.
For example, an interesting study conducted at the Univer-
sity of Washington2• tested the effects of inadmissible evidence
on the decisions of jurors. The authors of the test designed a
variety of scenarios whereby some jurors heard about an in-
criminating piece of evidence while other jurors did not. The
study found that the effect of the inadmissible evidence was
.directly correlated to the strength of the prosecutor's case. The
authors of the study reported that when the prosecutor pre-
sented a weak case, the inadmissible evidence did, in fact,
prejudice the jurors. Furthermore, the judge's admonition to the
jurors to disregard certain evidence did not have the same effect
as when the evidence had not been mentioned at all. It had a
prejudicial impact anyway.
However, the study also indicated that when there was a
strong prosecution case, the inadmissible evidence had little, if
any, effect'.21 Nonetheless, the most significant conclusion from
IS See Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-13 (1980) ("The dnty of
the prosecutor is to seek justice.").
19 Of course, this may apply· to other attorneys as well.
20 Sue, "The Effects of Inadmissible Evidence on the Decisions of Simulated
. Jnrors-A Moral Dilema," 3 J. Applied Soc-, Psychology 345 (1973).
. 21 Perhaps lending validity to application of the harmless error· doctrine, which
will be discussed later in this article. .
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the study is that inadmissible evidence had its most prejudicial
impact when there was little other evidence on which the jury
could base a decision. In this situation, "the controversial evi-
dence becomes quite salient in the jurors' minds."22
Finally, with respect to inadmissible evidence and stricken
testimony, even if one were to reject all of the studies dis-
cussed, it is still clear that although "stricken testimony may
tend to be rejected in open discussion, it does have an impact,
perhaps even an unconscious one, on the individmll juror's
judgment."" As with previously discussed points, this factor-
the unconscious effect of stricken testimony or evidence-will
generally not be lost on the prosecutor who is in tune with the
psychology of the jury.
The applicability of these studies to this analysis, then, is
quite clear. Faced with a difficult case in which there may be a
problem of proof, a prosecutor might be tempted to sway the
jury by adverting to a matter which might be highly prejudicial.
In this connection, another study24 has suggested that the jury
will more likely consider inadmissible evidence that favors the
defendant rather than inadmissible evidence that favors convic-
tion. 2S
Despite this factor of "defense favoritism," it is again evi-
dent that a prosecutor may find it rewarding to misconduct
himself in the courtroom. Of course, a prosecutor who adopts
the unethical norm and improperly allows jurors to hear inad-
missible proof runs the risk ofjeopardizing any resulting convic-
tion. In a situation where the prosecutor feels there is a weak
case, however, a subsequent reversal is not a particularly effec-
tive sanction when a conviction might have been difficult to
achieve in the first place. Consequently, an unethical courtroom
"trick" can be a very attractive idea to the prosecutor who feels
he must win." Additionally, there is always the possibility of
22 Sue, note 20 supra, at 351.
23 Hastie, Inside the Jury 232 (1983).
24 Thompson, "Inadmissible Evidence and Juror Verdicts," 401. Personality &
Soc. Psychology 453 (1981).
-25 The author did note that -the defendant in the· test case was very_sympathetic
ano. that the results may have been different with a less sympathetic defendant.
i6 -Of course, this begs the question: •'Is there a prosecutor who would take a case
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other conviction even after an appellate reversal. Indeed,
,'While a large number of cases are dismissed· following remand
'yan appellate court, nearly one half of reversals still result in
Orne type of conviction. 27 Therefore, a prosecutor can still
cceed in obtaining a conviction even after his misconduct led
tca reversal.
. An additional problem in the area of prosecutor-jury interac-
Ion is the ptosecutor' s prestige; since the prosecutor represents
'~$;f!~~e "government," jurors are more likely to believe him.2 ' Put
~~f:j(shnplY, prosecutors "are the good guys of the legal system,""
lli~j~ild because they have such glamour, they often may be tempt-
~~~'ed to use this advantage in an unethical manner. This presents
jjf~a problem for the prosecutor in that the "average citizen may
. "often forgive, yea urge prosecutors on in ethical indiscretions,
'Cor the end, convictions of criminals certainly justifies in the
public eye any means necessary."'o Consequently, unless the
. prosecutor is a person of high integrity and is able to uphold the
"highest moral standards, the problem of courtroom misconduct
> will inevitably be tolerated by the public..
Moreover, when considering the problems facing the pros-
ecutor, one also must consider the tremendous stress under
. which the prosecutor labors on a daily basis. Besides the stress-
ful conditions faced by the ordinary courtroom litigator,31 pros-
>ecuting attorneys, particularly those in large metropolitan
to trial and then feel that he didn't have to win?" It is hoped that, in such a situation
trial would never be an option. Rather, one would hope for an early dismissal ofth~
:charges.
27 Roper, "Does Procedural Due Process Make a Difference?" 65 Judicature 136
(1981). This article suggests that the rate of nearly 50 percent of acquitals following
rev~rsal.is 'proof that due process is a viable means for legitimatizing· the judiciary.
,<WhIle thIS IS true, the fact remains that there is still a 50 percent conviction rate after
reversal. thereby giving many prosecutors a.second chance to convict after their
j)riginal misconduct.
....•. 28 See People v. McCoy, 220 N.W.2d 456 (Mich. 1974), where the prosecutor, in
.atteml?tmg to bolster his case, told the jury that "the Detroit Police Department, the
detectives 10 the Homicide Bureau, these detectives you see i~ court today, and
myself from the prosecutor's office, we don't bring cases unless we're sure unless
we're positive." Id. at 460; . ,
;';"r' 29 Emmons, "Morality and Ethics-A Prosecutor's View," Ad,vancedCriminal
.' rIal Tactics 393-407 (P.L.I. 1977)., .
30 [d.
,f;l;:_£ 31 f~r-~-inter~stingarticle on the t~pic,see Zimmerman, "Stre~s ~n~ thetri~ .
c}'{ awyer," 9 Litigation 4, 37-42 (1983).
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areas, are faced with huge and very demanding case loads. As a
result of case volume and time demands, prosecutors may not
be able to take advantage of opportunities to relax and recover
from the constant onslaught their emotions face every day in the
courtroom.J2
Under these highly stressful conditions, it is understandable
that a prosecutor occasionally may find it difficult to face· these
. everyday pressures and to resist temptations to behaveunethi_
cally. It is not unreasonable to suggest that the conditions under
which the prosecutor works can have a profound effect on his
attempt to maintain high moral and ethical standards. Having
established this hypothesis, one can see yet another reason why
courtroom misconduct may occur.
Why Misconduct Continues?
Having demonstrated that courtroom misconduct may, in
many instances, be highly effective, the question arises as to
why such practices continue in ourjudicial system. A number of
reasons may account for this phenomenon. Perhaps the most
significant reason for the continued presence of prosecutorial
misconduct is the harmless error doctrine. Under this doctrine,
an appellate court can affirm a conviction despite the presence
of serious misconduct during the trial. As Justice Traynor once
stated, the "practical objective of tests of harmless error is to
conserve judicial resources by enabling appellate courts to
cleanse the judicial process of prejudicial error without becom-
ing mired in harmless error." 33
Although the definition advanced by Justice Traynor por-
trays the harmless error doctrine as having a most desirable
consequence, this desirability is undermined when the pros-
cutor is able to misconduct himself without fear of sanction.
Additionally, since every. case is different, what constitutes
harmless error in one case may be reversible error in another.
Consequently, harmless error determinations do not offer any
significant precedents by which prosecutors canjudgethe status
of their behavior.
32 For example, the Zimmerman article suggests time offfrorn work and "celebra~
t.ion." -Wi~h family and friends in order to effectively induce relaxa.tion; ~~
J3 R. Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless Error 81 (1970).
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>i. By way of illustration, consider two cases in which the
prosecutor implicitly told the jury of his personal belief in the
defendant's guilt. In one case,the prosecutor stated, "I have
·hever tried a case where the evidence was so clear and convinc-
il1g. "34 In the other case, the prosecutor told the jury that he did
llot try cases unless he was sure of them.3S In the first case the
.conviction was affirmed, while in the second case the convic-
tion was reversed. Interestingly,the court in the first case
affirmed the conviction despite its belief that the "prosecutor's
remarks were totally out oforder." 36 Accordingly, despite rnak-
: lug comments which were "totally out of order," the pros-
ecutor did not suffer any penalty.
Contrasting these two cases presents clear evidence of what
is perhaps the worst derivative effect ofthe harmless error rule.
The problem is that the stronger the prosecutor's case, the more
misconduct he can commit without being reversed. Indeed, in
the Shields case, the court stated that "the guilt of the defen-
dant was clearly established not only beyond a reasonable
doubt, but well beyond any conceivable doubt."37 For purposes
of our analysis, it is clear that by deciding as they do, courts
often provide little discouragement to a prosecutor who be-
lieves, and rightly so, that he does not have to be as careful
about his conduct when he has a strong case. The relation of
this factor to the amount of courtroom misconduct cannot be
ignored.
Neither can one ignore the essential absurdity of a harmless
error determination. In order to apply the harmless error rule,
appellate judges attempt to evaluate how various evidentiary .
items or instances of prosecutorial misconduct may have af-
fected the jury's verdict. Although it may be relatively simple in
some cases to determine whether· improper conduct during a
trial was harmless, there are many instances when such an
analysis cannot properly be made, but nevertheless is made.
example, consider the situation when an appellate court is
divided on whether or not agiven error was harmless. In United
34 People v. Shields, 58 A.D:2d 94, 96 (N.Y.I,aff'd, 46 N.Y.2d 764 (1977).
3S People v. McCoy, 220 N.W.2d 456 (Mich. 1974).
36 Shields, 58 A.D.2d at 97.
37 [d. at 99.
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38 155 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1946).
. " 73 F.2d 278 (1934), rev'd, 295 U.S. 78 (1935).
40 Shields, 58 A.D.2d at 97.
States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co. ,38 two judges (including JUdg
Learned Hand) believed that the prosecutor's error was har
less. Yet, Judge Frank, the third judge sitting in the cas
completely disagreed, writing a scathing dissent nearly thre
time the length of the majority opinion. One wonders ho
harmless error can be fairly applied when there is such a si'
nificant difference of opinion among highly respected membe
ofa court as to the extent of harmfulness of trial errors .Perha
eVen more interesting is the Supreme Court's reversal of tn
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit's unanimous findingq
harmless error in United States v. Berger." As noted, Berge
now represents the classic statement of the scope of the pro'
ecutor's duties. Yet, in his majority opinion for the Second
Circuit, JUdge Learned Hand found the prosecutor's miscon~
duct harmless.
The implications of these contradictory decisions are sig
nificant, for they demonstrate the utter failure of appellat
courts to provide incentives for the prosecutor to control his<
behavior. If misconduct can be excused even when reasonable
judges differ as to the extent of harm caused by such misbehav
ior, then very little guidance is given to a prosecutor to assist
him in determining the propriety of his actions. Clearly, Without!
such guidance, the potential for misconduct significantly in,
creases.
The Shields case presents yet anotherfactor which suggest'
why the prosecutor has only a limited incentive to avoid mis-,
conduct. In Shields, the court refused to review certain "poten,
tially inflammatory statements" made by the prosecutor be'
cause of the failure of the defense to object.4• Although this
approch has not been uniformly applied by all courts, the impli-'
cations of this technique to reject a defendant's claim are cotV,
siderable. Most important, it encourages prosecutors to make
remarks that they know are objectionable in the hope that
defense counsel will notobject. This situation recalls the prevk
ous discussion which dealt with the effect of inadmissible evi-
dence on jurors. Defense counsel here is in a difficult predica>:z~
~I;
140 j
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ent. Ifhe does not object, he ordinarily waives any appealable
issue in the event of conviction. If he does object, he highlights
to the jury the fact that the prosecutor has just done something
Which, some jurors may feel, is so damaging to the defendant
'that the defense does not want it brought out.
The dilemma of the defense attorney in this situation is
confirmed by a Duke University study.4l In that study, jurors
iEiW learned of various pieces of evidence which were ruled inadmis-IE~ii:EJ~"f.S~i~;;~::~~~::::;:;iE~~~i;
'E7;<remark is made by the prosecutor, defense counsel must act
''''carefully to avoid damaging his client's case. In short, the
prosecutor-has yet another weapon, in this instance an arguably
unfair aspect of the appellate process, which requires preserva-
tion of an appealable issue.43
A final point when analyzing why prosecutorial misconduct
persists is the unavailability or inadequacy of penalties visited
upon the prosecutor personally in the event of misconduct.
Punishment in our legal system comes in varying degrees. An
appellate court can punish a prosecutor by simply cautioning
him not to act in the same manner again, reversing his case, or,
in some cases, identifying by name the prosecutor who miscon-
ducted himself." Even these punishments, however, may not
be sufficient to dissuade prosecutors from acting improperly.
One noteworthy case45 describes a prosecutor who appeared
., Wolf. "Effects of Inadmissible Evidence and Level of Judicial Admonishment
to Disregard on the Judgments of Mock Jurors;' 7 J. Applied Soc. Psychology 205
(1977).
42 Additionally of note is the fact that if the judge rules the evidence and did nOl
, admonish. the jury. then the biasing effect of the evidence was eliminated. The
authors of the study concluded that by being told not to consider certain evidence,
thej~rors felt a 10s8 of freedom and that in orqer to retain their freedom, they
consIderedit anyway. The psychological-term for this'effect is called reactance. .
'-'f,' . 43 Of course,- this does not mean that appeals should always be allowed, even in
,the absence of an appealable issue. Rather, one should confine ·the availability of
these appeals to the narrow circumstances' discussed.
',.' " See United States v. Burse, 531 F.2d 1151 (2d Cir. 1976), where the court
~-::;::!1amed- the prosecutor in'the body of its opinion.
':~<.
"c.' 45 United States v. Drummond, 481 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1973).~!i;:i<-
W'F'
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before the appellate court on a misconduct issue for the third
time, each instance in a different case.
Perhaps the ultimate reason for the ineffectiveness of the
judicial system in curbing prosecutorial misconduct is that pros•.
ecutors are not personally liable for their misconduct. In Im-
bler v. Pachtman:6 the Supreme Court held that "in initiating a
prosecution and in presenting the state's Case, the prosecutor is
immune from a civil suit for damages. under Section 1983."47
Furthermore, prosecutors have absolute, rather than a more
limited, qualified, immunity. Thus, during the course ofa trial,
the prosecutor is absolutely shielded from any civil liability
which might arise due to his misconduct, even if that miscon-
duct was performed with malice.
There is clearly a need for some level of immunity to be
accorded all government officials. Without such immunity,
much of what is normally done by officials in 'authority might
not be performed out of fear that their practices are later
deemed harmful or improper. Granting prosecutors a certain
. level of immunity is reasonable. Allowing prosecutors to be
completely shielded from civil liability in the event of miscon-
duct, however, provides no deterrent to courtroom misconduct.
Conclusion
This analysis was undertaken to determine why the issue of
misconduct seems so prevalent in the criminal trial. For the
prosecutor, the temptation to cross over the allowable ethical
limit must often be irresistible because of the distinct advan-
tages that such misconduct creates in assisting the prosecutor to
win his case by effectively influencing the jury. Most. pros-
ecutors must inevitably be subject to this temptation. It takes a
constant effort on the part of every prosecutor to maintain the
high moral standards which are necessary to avoid such tempta-
tions.
Despite the frequent occurrences of courtroom misconduct,
appellate courts have not provided significant incentives, to the
prosecutor to avoid misconduct. It is not until the courts decide
46 424 U.s. 409 (1976).
47 /d. at 431. 42 U.S.CO § 1983 authorizes civil actions against stateoifidaIs who
violate civil rights "under color of state law."
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't~e a stricter, more consistent approach to this problem,
inroads will be made in the effort to end it. One solution
ht be to impose civil liability on the prosecutor who miscon-
s himself with malice. Although this will not solve the
lem, it might be a step in the right direction.
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